

# Summary and recommendations of the border control and farm biosecurity assessment mission in Taiwan

## Conclusion:

1. The prevention, early detection and control of ASF requires a shared responsibility among pig producers, the pig industry, academia, research institutes, several government agencies (BAPHIQ, APDCC (Kinmen), CGA, EPA, Police and Customs) at national and local levels.
2. Pre-border, Border and Post-border approaches to risk management are recommended. Pre-border involves identifying and reducing risks offshore, and shared approaches to international cooperation and information exchange, research and disease prevention. Border involves activities to increase biosecurity and manage the entry of risk products at all entry points. Post border activities include improvements in farm biosecurity, minimising and controlling feeding of feed wastes and proper check of feed additives, surveillance, early detection and preparedness for emergency response. Training and communication are important at each point.
3. The risk pathways for African swine fever (ASF) invasion in Taiwan include inbound passengers, imported goods from endemic areas, contaminated feed, smuggling, shipping and airplane wastes, Mini-three-links, and **floating** garbage (including **floating** dead pigs in Kinmen and Matzu).
4. Airport and harbor quarantine inspection of luggage, express delivery goods, mail packages, food-waste disposal, smuggling investigation, **floating** dead pigs patrols and disposal are already implemented in Taiwan and will contribute towards decreasing the risk of African Swine Fever incursion.
5. Taiwan has strengthened border control measures, including penalties for violations, control of high risk personnel, disinfectant carpets at entry points and harbors and reinforcing delivery package inspection; and will continue to implement quarantine measures at the border.
6. Swill feeding is a high risk for the introduction of ASF. Taiwan authorities currently allow food waste recycling on 750 premises registered by EPA and COA under stringent regulations for heat

treatment of food waste and high level biosecurity. Compliance with these standards is variable and improvement of swill feeding in other registered pig farms is required.

7. The improvement and implementation of biosecurity measures at pig farms are crucial to preventing epidemics in African swine fever, including effective management of personnel, vehicles and articles, and cleaning and disinfection of facilities. Also, the government should help farmers or producers to clearly understand the appropriate use of effective disinfectants for controlling the ASFV at the farm level.
8. There is a need to enhance education of farmers on biosafety concepts, through implementation of vehicle disinfection (in and out of pig farms), preventing unnecessary personnel from entering, immediately reporting to veterinarians and local disease control officers when abnormal signs observed.
9. The activities required for the prevention, early detection and rapid response of ASF are similar to those required for other important diseases of pigs including FMD and new pathogens or strains of existing pig diseases, therefore the benefits are much greater than for ASF alone.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS MADE:**

#### **Border Control Inspection measures**

1. To build on the work done in this evaluation, it is proposed that a risk assessment (similar to those used by FAO/OIE/WHO) be carried out and that this will be the basis for periodic review of risks and provide advice for future activities to manage the risks. The RA development should be overseen by an expert group and include assessment of pre-border, border and post-border risks and establishment of risks at critical points along the risk pathways from sources of ASF in infected countries to pigs in Taiwan.
2. Pre-border risk management can be strengthened by improving international cooperation and exchange of information, participating in the OIE/FAO Asian Working Group on ASF research and missions to study ASF in relevant countries.
3. Epidemiological studies will provide further understanding of the risks from **floating** dead pigs in the area around Kinmen Island. The study

should involve simulation of movements of dead pigs (using SAROP) from river mouths near mainland China, using official and unofficial sources of data to study the epidemiology of ASF outbreaks in pig populations in the area and the risk of dead pigs in the water. Evaluation of the continuing need for sampling and submission of samples from dead pigs is recommended.

4. Continue to implement border control and related quarantine measures, to ensure that staff shortages are addressed and that staff training is sufficient to support staff requirements for long-term border control.

### **Post-border prevention**

5. Improper treatment of food-waste is one of the risks for the introduction and transmission of ASF. In the short term, it is recommended that current registered premises are urgently upgraded to the required standards and that there are related monitoring and verification measures in place. It is also recommended that consideration be made to reduce the number of registered premises and ensure that they all meet the highest standards for safety.
6. It is very important to keep working with pig farmers to prevent invasion and spread of African swine fever.